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MEDIATING BETWEEN GOD AND MAN:
Towards a Poetics of Sacred Discourse
KAREN BENNETT
The Bible has, over the years, been read from a vast array of
different perspectives, and has proved a happy hunting ground for
people of many disciplines. In the light of postmodern decentrings, it
is natural that the focus of attention should have shifted to the text in
itself, and consequently, there has been a plethora of studies aimed at
investigating the Bible as Literature, a discourse-oriented approach
that sets out to understand the text ‘as a pattern of meaning and
effect’. It asks questions such as: ‘what does this piece of language
signify in context? What are the rules governing the transaction
between storyteller or poet and reader? Are the operative rules, for
instance, those of prose or verse, parable or chronicle, omniscience or
realistic limitation, historical or fictional writing? What image of the
world does the narrative project?’ – all very valid questions in a world
in which we no longer have any guarantees of an objective reality
behind the linguistic sign.
Meir Sternberg’s work The Poetics of Biblical Narrative is one
such attempt to read the Bible as literature, and indeed, the questions
given above are his formulations (1987: 15). We expect therefore to
encounter a reading of biblical discourse that takes the socio-cultural
context of production into account; for it is only in context that these
questions become meaningful. We can only pronounce upon the
meaning of textual language if we understand something about the
projected function of the work as a whole; and the rules governing the
transaction between storyteller and reader have obviously shifted
many times throughout the history of narrative production.
It comes as a surprise, therefore, to find that, of all the possible
literary models available throughout world history, Meir Sternberg has
chosen to assume that the ‘operative rules’ at work on the Bible are
similar to those operating on a 19th century or modernist novel. All his
narratological conclusions are subordinated to this model, and, as a
result, he builds up a reading of Biblical discourse that, whilst being
internally coherent in itself, clashes with our intuitions. Surely the
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Biblical narrator could not have been as self-consciously artful and
manipulative as Sternberg makes out? Could the projected narratee
really have been as eminently reasonable and democratically-minded
as he assumes? After all, several thousand years separate the context
of production from this particular context of reception, and there have
been many dramatic paradigm shifts in the meantime, not least of
which is the Enlightenment and the ‘scientific’ view of reality that
followed in its wake.
Meir Sternberg’s own discourse is also ridden with value
judgements that he takes no pains to justify or conceal. It is clear that,
to him, what is ‘artful’ or ‘crafty’ or ‘devious’ is good, whilst
‘naïvety’ is abhorrent, symptomatic of lack of mental sophistication.
In short, he is clearly privileging the rational, analytical, logos-
oriented mode of thought at the expense of a more imaginative,
synthetic, mythos-based model. Consequently, his interpretation of
Biblical narrative reads rather as if he is desperately trying to save the
Biblical narrative from charges of primitivism and prove that the
narrator is a ‘modern’, an approach which clearly lays itself open to
allegations of anachronism, among other things.
The problem, it seems to me, is essentially a question of genre.
Our interpretation of any work is largely conditioned by the category
in which we choose to insert it, for this presupposes a certain function
of the text, a certain relationship between narrator, narratee and text,
and a certain use of language. Sternberg’s assertion, in his opening
chapter, that the work, functionally-speaking ‘is regulated by three
principles: ideological, historiographic, and aesthetic’ has implications
for all narratological dimensions. Particularly, the assumption that the
text aims to persuade and inform presumes a gap in status and/or
knowledge between narrator and narratee, and a connative or
referential use of language (to use Roman Jakobson’s classification),
that may not originally have been present.
To my mind, something important is missing from this analysis,
namely the notion of the sacred. Whilst this term is not usually
present in the narratologist’s lexicon, it seems indispensable when
dealing with a work like the Bible. As Mircea Eliade asserts, ‘The
completely de-sacralised Cosmos is a recent discovery in the history
of the human mind. Although it is not our role here to show the
historical processes or alterations to spiritual behaviour that led to this
situation, modern man has de-sacralised his world and has assumed a
profane existence. For our purpose it is enough to assert that de-
sacralisation is characteristic of the total experience of non-religious
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man in modern societies, and, as a consequence, he finds it
increasingly difficult to understand the existential dimensions of the
religious man in archaic societies’1.
If the Bible is considered to have been produced within the sacred
mindset, then all presuppositions about narrator/narratee and discourse
take on an altogether different aspect. It is my objective in this paper,
therefore, to explore the possibilities of a distinct mode of discourse
based upon the notion of the sacred, and to suggest directions in which
an eventual poetics of sacred discourse might lead. I do not consider
myself competent to offer any hard and fast interpretations of Biblical
passages under this rubric, since, as I explain below, this ultimately
requires a profound knowledge not only of the entire text but also of
the Hebrew language which I unfortunately do not have.  Instead, I
will limit myself to asking questions and suggesting directions in
which future study might proceed. But for this we must begin by
defining what exactly we mean by ‘sacred’.
*   *   *
As Mircea Eliade suggested in the quotation given above, it is not
easy for modern man, brought up on a diet of rationalistic scientific
enquiry, to understand what is meant by ‘sacred’. Religious writings
themselves are very little help, since they presume an inside view.
Perhaps the first thinker to attempt to define the sacred experience in
anything like a ‘scientific’ way was Rudolf Otto, who focused upon
the sentiment of awe and mystery provoked in the individual when
confronted with the ‘numinous’. He also emphasised the essentially
non-rational nature of the experience: ‘The sacred is, first and
foremost, a category of interpretation and evaluation which only exists
as such in the religious domain….. it contains an element which
escapes all rationality, constituting as such an arrêton, something
ineffable’2
More helpful still is Mircea Eliade, who defines the Sacred in
respect to its opposite, the Profane: ‘…for the ‘primitive’ as for the
man of all pre-modern societies, the sacred equalled power, and,
ultimately, reality itself. Sacred potency means at the same time
reality, eternity and efficiency. The opposition sacred/profane is often
equivalent to an opposition between real and unreal or pseudo-
                                                          
1 From O Sagrado e o Profano (p.27), translated from the Portuguese by the
author.
2 From the Portuguese edition of O Sagrado (p.13), translated by the author.
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real…Thus, it is easy to understand that the religious man deeply
desires to be, participate in reality, become saturated with power’3.
This notion is extended in his other work, The Myth of the Eternal
Return, in the following fashion: ‘If we observe the general behaviour
of archaic man, we are struck by the following fact: neither the objects
of the external world nor human acts, properly speaking, have any
autonomous intrinsic value. Objects or acts acquire a value, and in so
doing become real, because they participate, after one fashion or
another, in a reality that transcends them. Among countless stones,
one stone becomes sacred – and hence instantly becomes saturated
with being – because it constitutes a hierophany, or possesses mana,
or again because it commemorates a mythical act, and so on…’
(1954:3-4).
Expressed in this way, the experience immediately becomes
intelligible as a kind of semiosis, the attribution of meaning to the
chaos of primary perceptual experience. Suddenly we find that the
chasm separating us from archaic man shrinks to a mere fissure; for,
in constituting his hierophanies, he is essentially engaged in the same
task as we are when we select facts to be included in our personal
autobiographies and national history curricula, or as we delimit and
organise our personal space. In short, he is engaged in the construction
of an Identity, a vision of the world with himself at the centre,
separated from the Other by boundary protected by taboo.
This becomes clearer when we note the similarities between this
discourse of the Sacred and post-colonial discourse of the Nation.
Eliade (1954:6-17) describes how, to the archaic mindset, the wild
uncultivated regions of the world are assimilated to chaos, and how,
consequently, settlement in a new, unknown country is equivalent to
an act of Creation, accompanied by rituals of consecration, aimed at
constituting a sacred centre that becomes the axis mundi. Similarly,
Renis Debray, quoted by Timothy Brennan in a post-colonial work
entitled ‘The National Longing for Form’ (1990:51) states: ‘we should
not become obsessed by the determinate historical form of the nation-
state but try to see what that form is made out of.  It is created from a
natural organization proper to homo sapiens, one through which life
itself is rendered untouchable or sacred. This sacred character
constitutes the real national question’. The quotation continues: ‘The
second founding gesture of any human society is its delimitation
within an enclosed space. Here also there takes place an encounter
                                                          
3 From O Sagrado e O Profana (p.27), translated from the Portuguese by the
author.
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with the sacred, in the sense of the Temple. What is the Temple,
etymologically?  It was what the ancient priest or diviner traced out,
raising his wand heavenwards, the outline of a sacred space within
which divination could be undertaken. This fundamental gesture is
found at the birth of all societies, in their mythology at least. But the
myth presence is an indication of something real’.
The same kind of organisational principle applies to Time as well
as to Space. Debray says that the first step toward the creation of a
sense of national identity is ‘a delimitation in time, or the assignment
of origins, in the sense of an Ark.  This means that society does not
derive from an infinite regression of cause and effect. A point of
origin is fixed, the mythic birth of the Polis, the birth of Civilization or
of the Christian era, the Muslim Hegira, and so on. The zero point or
starting point is what allows ritual repetition, the ritualization of
memory, celebration, commemoration – in short, all those forms of
magical behaviour signifying defeat of the irreversibility of time'4.
This unexpected point of contact between ancient and modern
civilisations may be extended if we consider the process by means of
which an object or event becomes endowed with sacred status. Take,
for example, the stone in Eliade’s quotation that becomes ‘saturated
with being’: it could have been the stone that Jacob erected at Bethel.
It could just as easily be a stone that some geologist or archaeologist
or sculptor finds in a field, which for some reason, exhibits some
potential for becoming a Sign in their particular universe of meanings.
Obviously the meanings attributed are different in each case. But the
processes by means of which the stone becomes consecrated as a Sign
are remarkably similar. In each case, the object is firstly cordoned off
(symbolic marking of boundary) and protected from contamination5;
then, its status as Sign is proclaimed (at conferences, in the case of the
scientists) and consecrated textually. If this is accepted by the
community at large, then it will enter the Canon, and thereafter, will
be housed in the rarefied atmosphere of the museum or gallery, and
spoken about in hushed tones of awe. Indeed, the very name of the
Prophet who first proclaimed the Sign gains a sacred glow through
association, and will be treated with the utmost respect, at least until
some upstart comes along and institutes a process of demythification
                                                          
4 Thus, modern national celebrations such as American Independence Day and
Portuguese 25th April may be considered sacred to the national sense of identity just
as the foundation days for the primitives.
5 The anthropologist Mary Douglas (1966) describes at length the way in which
notions of hygiene and pollution reflect Identity, and as such may be assimilated to
our notion of the Sacred.
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aimed at overthrowing the old god and setting up a new idol in its
place.
Thus, it is clear that our stone, in phenomenological terms, was
effectively brought into being by our archaeologist or geologist, and
from then on, gained a numinous quality through participating in a
network of meanings centred around the identity of the discipline in
question. We could at this point ask if the stone has any objective
meaning at all independent of the beholder? C.S. Pierce would answer
in the negative, that the sign does not even exist until perceived as
such. Consequently, the whole notion of ‘objectivity’ may disappear
altogether, or be revealed as merely the dominant meaning, enforced
through structures of power and without any independent validity.
This concept will be important for our discussion of the Bible.
To recapitulate, then, it seems that Eliade’s notion of the Sacred
may be equated with a process of semiosis, by means of which the
Chaos of sensory perception is endowed with significance. This may
operate at the level of the Individual or the Group. In the case of the
former, a car gains a sacred dimension when the owner sees it, not as
mere means of getting about, but as a symbol of his status/virility etc.
For a People (tribe, nation, or community of archaeologists), places,
objects, people may be endowed with sacred status in the same way.
The same applies to Discourse. The young man with the sacred car
makes a selective rendering of past events to his bolster his
constructed Identity (he may emphasise or even invent sexual
conquests, for example), just as a Nation tells and teaches its history in
a selective way. In both cases, those events which are felt to be
significant are illuminated at the expense of those which are not; that
is to say, they become real to the organising mind, and if the degree of
passionate engagement with the sign is sufficiently intense, then, even
in the modern world, it gains the glow of the numinous that Otto
describes.
As we have seen, the consecration of meaning is part of the
construction of Identity, and this is instituted and maintained through
Ritual. It is in this sense, then, that the Bible becomes unequivocally a
Sacred Text. It is a type of discourse sustained with a view to defining
the identity of the people that gave rise to it, and every stage of its
production and reproduction (including oral repetition, writing,
editing, interpreting and translation) constitute a kind of consecration
ritual. Consequently, it may no longer be considered as descriptive or
representational writing, or rhetoric, but something rather more akin to
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the Performative Speech Act (like ‘I hereby name you man and wife’,
or ‘I baptise this child…’) which alters one’s state in the world.
The repercussions of this shift upon the poetics of bible discourse
are immense. First and foremost, there is a collapse of the distinction
between Narrator and Narratee into a collective ‘us’ that stretches
from the present back into the mythical origins of the people. There is
no longer any Subject trying to persuade the Other of the rightness of
his viewpoint, because the Narratee is not the Other; the Other is the
profane creature outside the boundaries of the sacred precinct who
cannot participate in communal rites. Hence, there is no rhetoric, for
there is no need for it. Even Auerbach’s claim that the Bible ‘insists
that it is the only real world’ (1953:15) falls short, since his sentence
predicates a subject and an object, and even this gap has disappeared.
Secondly, there is a collapse of the distinction between the
Creator and the Created, or between Author and Text. Eliade says: ‘an
object or act becomes real only insofar as it imitates or repeats an
archetype. Thus, reality is acquired solely through repetition or
participation; everything which lacks an exemplary model is
“meaningless”, i.e it lacks reality. Men would thus have a tendency to
become archetypal and paradigmatic…he sees himself as real, i.e. as
“truly himself” only, and precisely, insofar as he ceases to be so’
(1954:34). Thus, in the act of writing or repeating the Bible stories,
the teller/writer leaves his separate profane existence behind and, at
least for the duration of the ritual, finds his true identity in this
communal activity. In merging with the archetype, the spirit of the
tribe, or God, comes into being
It is interesting at this point to make an analogy with a more
modern piece of discourse, uttered in a quite different context, which
seems to make a similar point about the need for archetypes. ‘A nation
is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth are but one,
constitute this soul or spiritual principle.  One lies in the past, one in
the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of
memories; the other is present-day consent, the desire to live together,
the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in
an undivided form. Man, Gentlemen, does not improvise. The nation,
like the individual, is the culmination of a long past of endeavours,
sacrifice and devotion. Of all cults, that of the ancestors is the most
legitimate, for the ancestors have made us what we are’.6
The phrase ‘Let there be light’ now takes on a whole new
dimension. The metaphor of lighting up a darkness seems to come to
                                                          
6 Renan, E. (1882:21)
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hand quite readily to describe the process of semiosis, and indeed, we
have already in this essay, quite naturally, used the words ‘highlight’
and ‘illuminate’ in this sense. Uttered as it is in the ritualistic
subjunctive, it is now clear that this phrase is some kind of magic spell
or incantation by means of which the collective identity/Spirit of
Tribe/God (which are ultimately the same) is summoned into being.
Thus, the group creates and is created by its God in an endless circular
process of semiosis based upon ritual. It is in this sense that Eliade
argues that the imitation of archetypes and the repetition of
paradigmatic gestures abolishes time: ‘through such imitation, man is
projected into the mythical epoch in which the archetypes were first
revealed’ (1954:35).
It should now be clear that, in sacred discourse, language
functions in a completely different way to what we are used to. While
characteristics of Jakobson’s poetic function may be retained (see
below), it no longer seems to be operating referentially or connatively,
but closer to Northrop Frye’s kerygmatic mode, as a ‘vehicle of
revelation’ (1983:29) ‘on the other side of the poetic’ in relation to
rhetoric (1990:101), or Halliday’s ritual function, serving to ‘define
and delimit a social group’ (1973:63). It is above all opaque, a kind of
magic spell or incantation, whose purpose is to change reality, rather
than convey information. Consequently, sounds (and possibly even the
visual shapes) become important in a way that they are not usually in
referential language7. Similarly, the denotative or referential meaning
gives way to the connotative or symbolic meaning, and the total
significance of the text is constructed analogically, through echoes and
associations and thematic links. Nothing is redundant.  A synonym is
never a simple synonym, introduced for cohesive purposes, but a
nucleus of meaning in its own right, with echoes and connections
elsewhere. Etymology gains a vital importance, as being evidence of
the word’s link to the archetypal past. Syntactical patterns are
significant, and not susceptible to surface transformation without loss
of meaning. Even those words usually considered to be semantically
                                                          
7 Northrop Frye (1990:64) says of this technique in poetry: ‘The effect of
exploiting the sound resemblances within a language is to minimize the sense of
arbitrariness.  Originally this procedure may often have been close to magic:  in magic
a causal connection between a word and a thing, a name and a spirit, is often assumed,
and in magic the poetic effort to get the right words in the right order may help to
affect something in the external world’.
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empty, such as those we know of as ‘grammatical words’, are likely to
be resonant in a way that they rarely are in other forms of discourse8.
The structure of sacred discourse is also considerably different
from rational forms of discourse dominant in modern society. Above
all, it is not linear; there is no sense of cause and effect, or of logic;
rather it is dominated by circular, chiastic9 and symmetrical patterns
based upon Repetition, for it is in this way that the group partakes of
the archetype. Therefore, all instances of repetition (on the level of
sound, word, phrase, sentence, metaphor or chunk of discourse)
deserve a great deal of attention. Unlike realist fiction, in which an
earlier instance is usually taken as a foreshadowing of what is to
come, in sacred discourse, truth value is determined by faithfulness to
the archetype. Indeed, Eliade (1954:75) even suggests that in the
simplest human societies, sin is defined as an act that does not derive
from an archetype (making an interesting correspondence with the
notion of norms in modern cultural studies), which would indicate that
acts that are variations on an archetype are stages in man’s gradual fall
from the state of grace. As an example of this we could look at the
patriarchs Abraham, Isaac and Jacob essentially as repetitions of
Adam (who was made in the image of God), and examine in what
ways their stories are repeated and in what ways they differ. Amongst
the many analogies that we could list, the fact that Abraham and Isaac
build wells while Jacob raises stones has already been pointed out.
The Well is, in itself, a very rich symbol with multiple connotations,
amongst which we could at random select the theme of water. This is
even more primary and resonant, taking us back to the Garden, which
was of course watered by four rivers and therefore needed no artificial
irrigation. But Adam transgressed and was banished, and thereafter his
descendants had to work and irrigate the land, because it no longer
yielded spontaneously. Water is now revealed to be not only a symbol
of fertility (connecting to all the other fertile/barren oppositions,
including the question of wives and offspring), but also of divine
grace. Adam failed to repeat the archetypal pattern perfectly, and
water was withdrawn; Jacob moves one more step away from the
                                                          
8 Hugh White (1991:74) discusses the role of personal pronouns in ‘symbolic
narrative’, suggesting that they ‘enable the subject to identify her/himself with a form
in an expressive act. In this act, the subject enters language and experiences
consciousness across the mediation of the sign which unites her/him with the other.
S/he experiences her/himself thus precisely in this encounter with another
consciousness in an event of mutual recognition’.
9 Many scholars have pointed the use of the chiastic or envelope structure in
Biblical narrative, most notably Joel Rosenberg (1984:52).
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archetype by heaving stones instead of digging wells, and grace is
withdrawn, for his wife Rachel is initially barren. Thus we can see
how failure to repeat the archetype perfectly (due in each case to a
kind of individualistic hubris that would have been anathema to the
collective spirit), results in a successive move away from the
archetypal centre. Consequently it becomes clear how a good god
could have in fact given rise to a bad world, one of the most thorny
questions that theology has had to grapple with for centuries.
Character in sacred discourse is also very different from character
in a realist novel. Rather, the personages are all instances of
archetypes, to one extent or another, and the more complex characters
are likely to be based on different archetypes, without any internal
coherence.  For example, David the young boy who defeats Goliath
may be linked analogically to the other instances of a weaker
prevailing over a stronger, rather than to David the King, who
certainly belongs to a different pattern.  Similarly, we should be
attentive to uses of the proper name (names, as we already know, are
highly significant) as opposed to apparently neutral substitutes such as
‘the man’ or ‘the king’, which may well point in quite a different
thematic direction. As an example, we could quote the use in the
Garden Story of both adam (with its etymological connection to the
ground) and ish (gender specific, and used to etymologise the word for
‘woman’, ishhah), which are clearly more than simple cohesive
devices as they would be in rational discourse.
 This kind of poetics privileges the earliest Hebrew versions of
the texts because all rewritings, adaptations and translations are
imperfect repetitions moving further and further away from the
archetype. As such, it has much in common with the interpretations
that Kabbalists and other mystics have been doing for centuries on the
assumption that Biblical Hebrew somehow corresponded more
perfectly to reality than other languages10. However, it is important
here to highlight that it is not Hebrew itself that is inherently superior,
rather it is ritualistic usage that generates allegorical meaning and
gives rise to a vast body of spiritual wisdom that we could perhaps
equate with the Soul of the Tribe.
                                                          
10 Umberto Eco explores this notion at length in his book The Search for the
Perfect Language, arriving of course at the conclusion that there is no perfect
language, and that Hebrew is an arbitrary system of signs like all others.
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*    *    *
In the final part of this work, I would like to look at two of the
passages analysed by Meir Sternberg, and suggest how a consideration
of the Bible as Sacred Discourse might lead to different conclusions.
As mentioned above, it is not my aim to offer a foolproof
interpretation of the passages in question, since that is clearly beyond
my competence; rather I would like to indicate some directions that
enquiry could take.
The first passage I would like to consider is I. Sam. 9:6-10,
concerning the role of the prophet. Meir Sternberg (1987:94-6),
predictably, given his propensity to overvalue rationalism, constructs a
complex argument to show that the Biblical narrator here is engaged
in ‘image-shattering’, offering ‘a thrust against the inflated figure cut
by the prophet in the popular imagination’. However, if the text is
analysed in accordance with the poetics of sacred discourse, then it
yields a completely different result. The three ‘synonyms’ used for the
prophet (‘man of god’, ‘seer’ and ‘prophet’), each belonging to a
different era, are also in a sense imperfect rewritings of an archetype,
and thus progressively deteriorating in truth-value. Given that
authority lies in tradition, then, to my mind, Sternberg is wrong in
seeing the deliberate highlighting of the etymological connection
between nabi (‘prophet’) and nabi (‘bring’) as indicating criticism on
the part of the narrator of the practice of bringing gifts to the prophet
(this indignation is Sternberg’s own, I think, given his viewpoint from
modern capitalist culture in which the concept of ‘alms’ is redundant).
Rather, I would suggest that Saul’s question ‘what shall we bring the
man?’ is merely bowing to the precedent of custom in an obedient
fashion. If there is any suggestion of a pejorative meaning here, it is
likely to lie in relation to the more archaic word ‘seer’ (pointed out in
9:9 in the sentence beginning ‘Formerly in Israel….’, which explicitly
makes the connection between the two). If the shaman was considered
in the past to have been gifted with special insight (and the
connections here with the theme of ‘seeing’ need to be explored), then
clearly some kind of distancing has taken place if the more modern
word now means ‘bring’. Could the notion of ‘bringing’ relate not to
the custom of bestowing gifts but to the idea of ‘bringing out’ hidden
truths? If so, then the truth is no longer as visible as it was in the past,
even to the prophet, but has to be coaxed out into view. In addition,
the fact of Saul wanting to ‘bring’ a gift to the prophet so that the
prophet can ‘bring’ something to them has a symmetry about it that
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need not be interpreted cynically in terms of a trading transaction.
Like the hospitality that is offered to the guest, this type of giving
perhaps has the practical and spiritual function of maintaining group
cohesion, of validating the role of the shaman rather than destroying
it.
The second passage I would like to consider is I Kings 21:13-6, in
which Naboth is stoned to death outside the city and the event is
variously reported, leading to Ahab’s seizing of his vineyard. Meir
Sternberg (1987:408-9) here has rightly taken notice of the most
salient feature of this passage, namely the insistent repetitions not only
of words, but also of phrase-length structures and overall sentence
organisation; however, he predictably focuses his analysis on the
information gaps in the various transmissions which he interprets as a
key to character. I would suggest that, once again, his conclusions
represent an imposition of a rational structure upon a text which is
determinedly non-rational. In this case, even in English, it is clear that
the repetitions have some kind of rhythmic logic and incantatory
effect that must surely be greatly accentuated in the Hebrew. There is
something in this formal repetition of information with a slight
addition each time, resulting in a longer and longer sentence, that is
reminiscent of the ‘There was an old lady who swallowed a fly’ - style
of nursery rhyme, even down to the deliberately abrupt and
unexpectedly down-to-earth ending. In this kind of doggerel, the
pattern is so overwhelmingly pleasing to our most primitive senses,
that we fail to notice the incongruous or outrageous meaning of the
words. We are led further and further away from semantics into the
realm of pure rhythm, the words gradually ceasing to operate as
independent signs, but instead becoming part and parcel of a
harmonious whole in which the repetition is all11. Then suddenly we
are brought back down to earth with a bump when confronted with a
new element that refuses to repeat the pattern but instead acts in a
new, original and rational way. The brief experience of solidarity
comes to an end and, to hide our disappointment, we (moderns, that
is) laugh at our own foolishness for having allowed ourselves to be
hypnotised in this way.
                                                          
11 It strikes me that gossip must function in a similar way, with the group-
consolidation function taking over from referential accuracy as repetitions become
gradually more and more outrageous. Indeed, this Biblical passage could clearly be
interpreted as a kind of rumour that grows and grows until it all explodes under its
own weight.
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This kind of passage, therefore, is like an experience of pure
ritual, which ends when Ahab breaks the pattern by interpreting the
words literally and using them as a basis for a new act. (It is clearly
he, not Jezebel, who breaks the chain, because, while her turn adds a
considerable amount of new information, she links it to the previous
one through repetition of the word ‘dead’, which presumably in
Hebrew contains a sound echo with the previously-used Preterite
form).  The message of this passage lies, therefore, not in its semantic
content so much as in its structure, which, I imagine, could be actively
experienced if the Hebrew were chanted aloud.  It is the same message
that we have encountered before, that repetitions conjure the spirit,
and that we must not break the chain, for to do so destroys the spell
and we return to the world of the profane.
*    *    *
As I hope I have shown in these brief analyses, there is much to
be gained by introducing the concept of ‘sacred’ into the poetics of
biblical narrative. Not only does it narrow the field of interpretative
possibilities, apparently infinite as far as this text is concerned, but it
also provides a safeguard against the projection of anachronistic
values that inevitably occurs when the field of ‘literature’ is left wide
open. For this, to my mind, is what Meir Sternberg has done. So
utterly convinced is he of the superiority of logos over mythos, and so
determined to save the text from charges of primitivism, that he
systematically projects the most tortuous logic onto his hapless
narrator, apparently unaware that man only began to think in a linear
logical way a relatively short time ago12.
In addition, he is apparently unaware that the most recent
tendencies in psychology, sociology and linguistics are pointing to the
possibility that modern man is not as rational as he likes to think he is,
and that there are all sorts of ritualistic tendencies underlying his
social behaviour. In particular, Discourse Analysis has shown that
much of our everyday conversation is regulated by conventional
patterns that operate on a level normally far below our conscious
control, and which can be analysed into predictable sequences of
Speech Acts, repeated time and time again in the endless process of
                                                          
12 There was of course a Classical Enlightenment two thousand years before the
European Enlightenment. However, to my knowledge, nothing of the sort took place
in antiquity within the Judaeo-Christian tradition.
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group consolidation13. Consequently, an analysis of the Bible as a
communal Speech Event, rather than as the ‘artful’ work of one
individual mind, would seem to be more in keeping with modern
linguistic trends.
I would like to finish by, rather roguishly, pointing out an irony
that may not have escaped the reader. It has already been
demonstrated that the Sacred mindset is totalitarian, in the sense that it
does not permit the existence of any alternative reality; all meanings
are its meanings. The world experienced in this way, while one-sided
to modern eyes, is nevertheless imbued with the most intense vitality,
since it is lived with passionate engagement, and felt with every fibre
of the body and soul. This is why primitive and not-so-primitive
peoples have always felt the urge to desecrate the shrines of rival
tribes and set up their own gods; they are, by imposing their own
meanings, protecting their own identity, since compromise effectively
means annihilation.
It therefore takes a very rational mind to respect what is sacred to
the Other. The temptation is always to get in there and impose your
own meanings on what went before, demoting what does not seem
significant and appropriating and redefining everything that appears to
have signic potential in your universe of representations. This works
on all levels - as regards other people’s property, another culture’s
relics, icons from the past. It also works with texts, for, as we have
seen, the endless process of rewriting and translation and updating is
nothing more than the desecration of the shrine of the tribe that went
before.
Seen in this light, Meir Sternberg’s insistence of the rightness of
his reading does not seem quite so rational. Nor does the concept of
‘sacred’ seem quite so primitive. Or perhaps, deep down, we are all
really ‘primitives’, and have a lot more in common with the Biblical
mindset than we realised. This, of course, was what Meir Sternberg
was trying to prove, just that, in my opinion, he got it the wrong way
round. In trying to show that the Biblical narrator was an artful
rational modern like himself, all he succeeded in proving was that,
beneath his own rational veneer, lurked a primitive urge to impose his
own kind of Sacred Order on the world.
                                                          
13 See, for example, Coulthard, An Introduction to Discourse Analysis, pp.59-95.
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